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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, In the interest of 
HALES, FLOYD ROGER (06-24-65) 
a person under eighteen years of age 
FLOYD ROGER HALE, by his next 
of kin and friends and custodians 
JOSE LTJJAN AND MAGGIE \ Case No. 
LUJAN, plaintiff and Appellant. I 1 3 9 1 8 
vs. 
MARILYN BAKER, CHRIS V. 
SAIZ AND MRS. CHRIS V. SAIZ, 
'Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves the custody of Floyd Roger 
Hales, who has been in the custody and control and home 
of Jose Lujan and Maggie Lujan since his birth. He 
will be ten years old in June, 1975 and that there has 
been a very close and affectionate association develop 
between the Lnjans, the Lujans' family and Roger. 
The Lnjans filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas 
Corpus. The Judgment purports to dispose of the Writ 
of Habeas Corpus, but is entitled in the case of State 
of Utah, in the interest of Hales, Floyd Roger. 
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The file, (record on Appeal), is not in chronolog-
ical order nor does the file reflect one case, but it re-
flects two separate cases and papers which really con-
stitute a hybrid of the two cases. The papers in the file 
at page 40, 41, 42, and 43 pertain to the Petition for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus and the Writ. The pleadings 
pertaining to the Writ of Habeas Corpus should not be 
intermingled with the papers in the case of State of 
Utah, in the interest of Hales, Floyd Roger. 
The papers pertaining to the case of State of Utah, 
in the interest of Hales, Floyd Roger, are the Affidavit 
and Order to Show Cause at page 32 and 33 and a 
Motion that the Order to Show Cause not be heard until 
the Petition for Extraordinary Writ has been referred 
to the Juvenile Court and heard (R. 34) and Answer to 
the Affidavit and Order to Show Cause, (R. 35, 36, 37). 
This matter was never heard by the Court and no Order 
entered on the Order to Show Cause. 
The two cases should not have been mixed because 
they are two separate and distinct cases. 
A Petition for Extraordinary Writ of Habeas 
Corpus was filed in the District Court of Salt Lake 
County on September 9, 1974, (R. 40, 41, 42). Based on 
that Petition, A Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued by 
the Court on September 9, 1974. (R. 43). 
Said Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus came on 
for hearing on September 25, 1974, and an Order by 
Judge Banks of the District Court was made: " I t is 
2 
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hereby certified to the Second District Juvenile Court of 
the State of Utah based upon Utah Code Annotated 
55-10-78." 
That the hearing of said case and Petition for 
Extraordinary Writ was Floyd Roger Hale, by his next 
of kin and friends and customers. Jose Lujan and 
Maggie Lujan vs. Marilyn Bakery Chris V. Saiz and Mrs. 
V. Saiz, his wife. 
That was the last time the heading of the case was 
used, notwithstanding the Petition and the "Writ of 
Habeas Corpus was heard on October 15, 1974. We 
quote from page 4 of the Juvenile Court transcript where 
the Court says: 
JUDGE WHITMEE: "Alright, the matter is 
before the Court, then, on a Writ of Habeas 
Corpus which was certified over by the District 
Court. Let's see — for hearing in this court. 
GOLDEN BOBBINS: Eight. 
JUDGE WHITMEE: Alright, you may proceed.'' 
The Order disposing of the Case was entitled State 
of Utah, in the interest of Hales, Floyd Eoger, a person 
under 18 years of age, which Order was duly objected 
to, but which Order stated " Petition for Extraordinary 
Writ is denied.'' 
That the Court assumed certain facts which were not 
in evidence or offered in evidence. 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Amended Order disposing of the case was en-
titled, "State of Utah, in the Interest of Floyd Roger 
Hales," but the Amended Order provided that the Peti-
tion for Extraordinary Writ is denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff asks that the Amended Order be reversed 
or stricken and that the Plaintiffs be given a hearing on 
the Petition for Extraordinary Writ of Habeas Corpus 
and that the Juvenile Court be directed to make 
recommendations to the District Court in those proceed-
ings and the proceedings be remanded to the District 
Court of Salt Lake County. 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
That the Petition for Extraordinary Writ (Habeas 
Corpus) recites that Jose and Maggie Lujan are the 
great uncle and great aunt of Floyd Roger Hales, and 
that they are the godfather and godmother of Floyd 
Roger Hales. That Floyd Roger Hales has been in their 
care and custody and under their control since ten days 
after his birth and that in the almost ten years that the 
Lujans have taken care of him, there has been a close 
friendly affectionate association develop. 
That Jose and Maggie Lujan have not been deprived 
of his custody by any legal proceedings. That the peti-
tioners own their own home, that Roger's mother is 
mentally ill and in the Utah State Mental Hospital, and 
4 
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that the father of Floyd Roger Hales gave the custody 
of the child to the petitioners and they have maintained 
and cared for him since his birth. That Floyd Roger Hales 
was illegally taken and restrained of his liberty by 
Marilyn Baker and Mr. and Mrs. Chris V. Saiz without a 
hearing on his rights or the rights of Jose and Maggie 
Lujan. That in the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 
it is alleged that the legality of petitioners restraint 
has not heretofore been adjudicated and no other applica-
tion for relief has been made and no other speedy or 
adequate remedy exists. 
That after the "Writ was filed, an Order was made 
setting it for hearing on September 25, 1974, at which 
time the District Court made an Order transferring the 
case to the Second District Juvenile Court by virtue of 
Section 55-10-78 part of which is as follows: 
"A district court may at any time decline to pass 
upon a question of custody and may certify that 
question to the juvenile court for a determination 
or recommendation.'? 
That after the filing of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 
an Order to Show Cause was issued by the Juvenile 
Court in the case of the State of Utah, in the interest 
of Hales, Floyd Roger, and was served upon Jose and 
Maggie Lujan. That Jose and Maggie Lujan filed a 
Motion that the case not be heard until after the hearing 
on the Writ of Habeas Corpus and that an Answer was 
filed to the Order to Show Cause, setting out that since 
the time that Floyd Roger Hales was two weeks old, he 
has been in the care, custody and control of Jose Lujan 
5 
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and Maggie Lujan and that they are entitled to the 
custody and control of Floyd Roger Hales. It further 
alleges that the Writ of Habeas Corpus provided for 
Roger should be in the custody of Mr. and Mrs. Lujan, 
but notwithstanding said Order, Marilyn Baker with 
officers arrested Floyd Roger Hales and held him in the 
Shelter Home. 
That upon a hearing before Richard Birrell, the 
hearing Officer, an Order was made that Jose Lujan 
and Maggie Lujan continue with the custody of Floyd 
Roger Hales until a hearing on the Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus and that Jose Lujan and Maggie Lujan 
have never had a hearing in regard to their rights as to 
the care, custody and control of Floyd Roger Hales. 
That no further proceedings have been taken in that 
case and no order entered pertaining thereto. 
The hearing on the Writ of Habeas Corpus was con-
tinued until the 24th day of October, 1974, at which time 
the Court stated: Page No. 4 of the Juvenile Court 
transcript: 
"JUDGE WHITMER: Alright, it's a District 
Court matter. Alright, I have that. 
GOLDEN ROBBINS: Right and it's been re-
ferred to your Honor by Judge Banks. 
JUDGE WHITMER: Yes, I've got that. 
GOLDEN ROBBINS: There should be an Order 
in the file. 
JUDGE WHITMER: Yes, there is. * * * Al-
right, the matter is before the Court, then on a 
6 
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Writ of Habeas Corpus which was certified over 
by the District Court. Let's see — for hearing in 
this Court. 
GOLDEN BOBBINS: Right.'' 
That Mr. Lujan was called as a witness and a Motion 
to Dismiss was made by Michael Stead, Juvenile Court 
transcript Page 4, and that no evidence was introduced 
in Habeas Corpus case. 
None of the file in the case of State of Utah, in the 
interest of Hales, Floyd Roger was introduced into 
evidence. 
That an Order was entered in the case, (R. 47 and 
48). Objections to the Order was made (R. 50, 51). An 
Amended Order was filed on the 12th day of November, 
1974, (R. 52, 53), adjudging that Petition for Extra-
ordinary Writ is denied. 
That in the transcript, the Court has made certain 
statements and referred to certain instruments which 
were not introduced in evidence or even offered in evi-
dence. 
After filing the Notice of Appeal, (R. 54) on the 
same day there was a Certificate that a Transcript had 
been Ordered (R. 57), which transcript was sent to the 
Juvenile Court showing it was filed on January 15,1975, 
in the Juvenile Court, but someone attached a note 
stating: "This volume is not certified as part of the 
record in Case No. 13918 — State in the interest of Floyd 
Roger Hales." The Juvenile Court prepared a tran-
7 
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script which was filed on March 3, 1975. Both of these 
transcripts are numbered separately and are not num-
bered as part of the record on appeal. Reference to the 
transcript is being described as the Juvenile Court 
Transcript and the court reporter's transcript. Neither 
of the transcripts purport to report any testimony or evi-
dence, but merely the statement of counsel and the Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN CHANG-
ING THE HEADING OF THE CASE FROM 
THE DISTRICT COURT CASE, PETITION 
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, TO A 
JUVENILE COURT CASE, STATE OF 
UTAH IN THE INTEREST OF HALES, 
FLOYD ROGER. THE CASE, HABEAS 
CORPUS, WAS CERTIFIED FROM THE 
DISTRICT COURT TO THE JUVENILE 
COURT AND THE CASE HEADING AND 
PROCEEDINGS SHOULD HAVE ALWAYS 
BEEN IN THE HABEAS CORPUS CASE. 
That the Writ of Habeas Corpus has always been 
used in the State of Utah for the purpose of determining 
the custody of children. That the Lujans are entitled to 
their day in court. They are entitled to a full and com-
plete hearing on the Writ of Habeas Corpus pertaining 
to their rights to the custody of Roger and Roger is 
entitled to a hearing on his rights as to who is to have 
custody of him. 
The Writ of Habeas Corpus guaranteed by the Utah 
Constitution, Article VIII, Section 7, which states: 
8 
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"The District court shall have original juridic-
tion in all matters civil and criminal, not ex-
cepted in this Constitution, and not prohibited by 
law; # * * The District courts or any judge 
thereof, shall have power to issue writs of habeas 
corpus." 
Section 55-10-78 provides: 
"Nothing contained in this act shall deprive the 
district courts of jurisdiction to appoint a guard-
ian for a child nor of jurisdiction to determine 
the custody of a child upon writ of habeas corpus.'' 
If Marilyn Baker and Mr. and Mrs. Saiz or the 
Juvenile Court wanted to raise the question of jurisdic-
tion, they should have done it by appropriate pleadings 
and evidence. No answer or pleading was filed as to the 
allegations contained in the petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus and no evidence was introduced. 
We submit that the Juvenile Court had no right not 
to hear the Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
POINT II 
THAT WITHOUT ANY EVIDENCE THE 
COURT DENIED THE WRIT OF HABEAS 
CORPUS AND THEREBY DENIED THE 
APPELLANTS AND ROGER OF THEIR 
DAY IN COURT. 
Neither Respondent or the Court or the Appellant 
introduced any evidence. There was talk, but no evi-
dence. 
9 
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Appellant should have been allowed to introduce 
evidence supporting the allegations set out in the Writ 
of Habeas Corpus. We submit that the allegations set 
out in the Writ of Habeas Corpus state facts upon which 
relief could have been granted. The appellants were 
deprived of the privilege of showing that the Juvenile 
Court never had jurisdiction and to show the fact that 
Roger was never a neglected or dependent child. The 
Court and counsel for defendant stated that from a moral 
obligation that the Lujans were entitled to Roger. The 
following cases hold that a child is not dependent or neg-
lected when he is being taken care of by a third party. 
In the case of In re State in the Interest of Valdez, 
504 P.2d 1372, page 1375 paragraph the Court says: 
" T h e fact that the child is being provided for in 
the home of someone who is not the child's parent 
does not show dependency or neglect. For the 
parent has the right to determine where and with 
whom a child shall l ive." 
In the case of In Re Bradley et al v. Miller et ux, 167 
P. 2d 978, on page 985, in the concurring opinion Justice 
Wolfe states: 
"Where a parent makes arrangements for some-
one else adequately to care for the child by some 
proper and responsible person, such parent may 
be, through others, caring for the child." 
We have heretofore cited under Point I the Constitu-
tion and the statute which would give the Lujans the 
right for a hearing under a Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
10 
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Under Point III we discuss that the Juvenile Court 
did not have jurisdiction of the appellant or Roger. 
The appellants were denied the right to introduce 
evidence and to question the jurisdiction of the Juvenile 
Court. 
POINT III 
JUVENILE COURT HAD NO JURIS-
DICTION OVER THE LUJANS. THEY 
WERE NEVER A PARTY TO THE LAW-
SUIT. THE JUVENILE COURT HAD NO 
JURISDICTION OVER ROGER, HE NEVER 
WAS AND IS NOT NOW A DEPENDENT OR 
NEGLECTED CHILD. 
There is erroneously in the records of the Juvenile 
Court an Affidavit and Order to show Cause in the 
Juvenile Court case and the Answer to Affidavit and 
Order to Show Cause by the Lujans. The Order to Show 
Cause and the Answer to Affidavit and Order to Show 
Cause were never heard and the only reason that I can 
think that they are in the record is because they were 
served after the Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued. 
In the Answer of the Lujans, they allege that they 
had never had a hearing in regards to their rights to the 
care, custody and control of Floyd Roger Hales and there 
is no evidence in the case that the Juvenile Court has 
obtained jurisdiction over Mr. and Mrs. Lujan. If there 
had been any part of the Juvenile Court record put in 
evidence, the appellants would have contested the juris-
diction of the Juvenile Court in the case of State of Utah, 
11 
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in the interest of Hales, Floyd Roger and as part of 
their authority, would have based their contest on the 
case of in re State in the Interest of Graham, et at, 170 
P.2d 172, in which case the Court sets out that the pe-
titioners must show that he was a neglected or dependent 
child or the Court would never have acquired jurisdiction, 
and we quote from Page 175, 1st column as follows: 
" A petition must be filed as required by Section 
14-7-13. Said petition to invoke the jurisdiction of 
the court must allege facts which would make the 
children either "Neglected", "Dependent" , or 
"del inquent" as defined by the Legislature in 
Section 14-7-5. The facts found by the court must 
be such as to show that the children were "neg-
lected", "dependent" or "del inquent" as defined 
by the Legislature; otherwise, the juvenile court 
is divested of jurisdiction to make any order in 
reference to said children except to dismiss the 
case, and to revoke all previous orders made 
therein. ' ' 
And the court further states on page 175 at the bot-
tom of the first column, quote: 
" I t is fundamental that a juvenile court may 
make no valid orders in reference to a child un-
less and until that court obtains jurisdiction of 
that child by complying with the statutory re-
quirements therefor. I t is just as fundamental 
that a parent 's right to the custody of his child 
cannot be determined so as to bind that parent 
unless and until the court obtains jurisdiction 
of that parent . ' ' 
And in the second column page 175, the court fur-
ther states: 
12 
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"This court on appeal will not presume jurisdic-
tion of the juvenile court but will closely examine 
the record to see that the legislatively specified 
actions have been taken and the necessary facts 
are alleged and found to give said court jurisdic-
tion in the particular case. ' ' 
The Lujans were never made a party to any pro-
ceedings in the Juvenile Court and we contend that the 
Juvenile Court never had jurisdiction over Eoger and it 
must affirmative appear in the juvenile proceedings 
which have never been offered in evidence in the "Writ of 
Habeas Corpus case. 
In the Graham case, Justice Wolfe calls attention 
to the careless way in which the record was kept in the 
Juvenile Court case. We have called to the Court's atten-
tion the disregard for the continuity of any case and of 
the trying of the case within the rules of evidence. 
In the case of State of Utah, in the interest of Rae 
Lynn Thornton, 422 P.2d 199, 18 Ut. 2d 297, in a cus-
tody case, the court on the bottom of the second column 
page 200 and the top of the first column page 201 says: 
" I n is the opinion of this Court further that the 
District Court, being a court of original jurisdic-
tion, pursuant to the Constitution of the State of 
Utah, cannot delegate and cannot divest its jur-
isdiction to the Juvenile Court in a case such as 
th is . " 
In the case of Eugene A. Anderson vs. Kathleen D. 
Anderson, 416 P.2d 308, 18 U.2d 89, it involves the 
question of when the District Court has granted a di-
vorce and awarded custody of children and support 
13 
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money, and the Juvenile Court in a proceedings in the 
interest of the children, makes a different Order, does 
its Order supersede the judgment of the District Court. 
The Court in answer to this question on page 310 states: 
" T o accept plaintiff's contention that the Juve-
nile court has exclusive jurisdiction precluding 
any further action by the District Court would 
have the effect of permitting the Juvenile Court 
to become a court of review which could modify 
or nullify the judgment and orders of the Dis-
trict Court. This would be neither essential to 
nor consistent with the purpose of the new stat-
ute, Sees. 15 and 16, Chapter 165 S.L.TT. 1965 
(Code identification, Sees. 55-10-77, 78 TJ.C.A. 
1953). I t is apparent that that purpose was to 
confer concurrent jurisdiction on the Juvenile 
Court to act in the interest of children in various 
kinds of troubled, circumstances set forth in Sec. 
77." 
Further at the bottom of page 310, 1st column the 
Court says: 
"The District Courts are created by our consti-
tution as courts of general jurisdiction having au-
thority in all cases both civil and criminal. This 
includes divorce and all matters relating thereto, 
including custody and support money. Whereas, 
the Juvenile Court is created by statute and has 
jurisdiction only in the cases specified therein. 
[3] Upon our consideration of the Juvenile 
Court Act hereinabove referred to, it is our opin-
ion that it does not and could not limit or cur-
tail the authority of the District Court. When 
that court has taken jurisdiction, the jurisdiction 
of the Juvenile Court may be invoked and it may 
act in the interest of the children in the cases 
specified therein, but its action must be regarded 
14 
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as supplementary to the action of the District 
Court; and it may not make orders in direct con-
flict with those of the District Court nor does its 
authority supersede or divest the District Court 
of jurisdiction." 
In this case, the Juvenile Court assumes jurisdic-
tion but there was no evidence introduced as to what 
the proceedings had been in the Juvenile Court and in 
what respect those proceedings affected the Lujans. 
The Court should have allowed a hearing and should 
have allowed evidence to be taken as to the conditions 
Eoger lived under and as to whether or not he had any 
preference. 
In the case of Hardy vs. Olsen, 180 P. 2d 210, the 
child is almost ten years of age and the Supreme Court 
held that the Court should inquire of the child and take 
into consideration the child's desire regarding further 
custody, and in the case of Hardy vs. Olson, page 215, 
first column, the Court says: 
"but would consider where the child would re-
ceive the greater degree of affection and discrim-
inating care which would tend to best fit them 
to take their places in the active affairs of life." 
And on page 215 top of second column: 
"What is for the best interests of the child! See 
Walton vs. Coffman, Utah, 169, P.2d 97, and 
Baldwin vs. Nelson, Utah, 170, P.2d 179 on re-
hearing 174 P.2d 437. Presumptions must yield 
to evidence that the interests of a child require 
it to be in the custody of another. The undis-
puted evidence is that the father, in this case 
15 
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neglected to support Judith or to provide for her 
welfare except by some infrequent gift of an ar-
ticle of clothing and permitted bonds of affection 
to develop between Judith and those who did pro-
vide for her well-being until she reached such age 
that her choice as to her custody became material 
in determining the issue." 
In the instant case the boy had been in the home 
for nearly 10 years. There have been marked bonds of 
affection between him and the Lnjans and in the event 
of their death, he would be taken care of by other mem-
bers of the family, which he feels he is a part of. 
In the case of In re State in the interest of Valdez, 
504 P.2d 1372, Valdez is accused of murdering his wife 
and a petition was filed in the Juvenile Court and it 
concluded that the children, as defined by the statute, 
were dependent children. The Supreme Court held on 
page 1374, as follows : 
" ( 1 , 2) The Juvenile Court was created by stat-
ute and has jurisdiction only in the cases spe-
cified therein. Its jurisdiction concerning custody 
and guardianship matters is strictly confined to 
those situations where its jurisdiction is invoked 
under Section 55-10-77; otherwise all disputes con-
cerning custody and guardianship are within the 
juriscdition of the district court, which cannot 
delegate or divest itself of jurisdiction to the 
Juvenile Court. 
And on Page 1375, the Court says: 
"In addition to such inherent jurisdiction, the 
district courts have specific statutory jurisdic-
tion in custody matters, e.g. separation and di-
vorce (Section 30-3-10), Habeas corpus proceed-
ings . . . " 
16 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT IV 
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN REFERRED BACK TO THE 
DISTRICT COURT FOR HEARING WITH 
THE JUVENILE COURTS RECOMMENDA-
TIONS. 
In the case of the State of Utah in the interest of 
Eae Lyn Thornton, 422 P.2d 199, 18 U. 2d 297, is a cus-
tody case, the Court on Page 200 says: 
"This case was referred by the Third District 
Court of the State of Utah to the Juvenile Court 
pursuant to Section 55-10-78, as amended, and 
particularly to the provisions stated therein as 
follows: 
'A district court may at any time decline to 
pass upon a question of custody and may cer-
tify that question to the juvenile court for 
determination or recommendation.' ' ' 
The Court states in the third paragraph, second 
column, page 200, and we quote: 
"The Juvenile Court assumed jurisdiction over 
the subject matter after the same had been re-
ferred to it by the District Court. The sole ques-
tion to be decided is the interpretation of the 
section hereinbefore referred to, and particularly 
the words: "* * * may certify that question to 
the juvenile court for determination or recom-
mendation. ' ' 
And the Court on the bottom of the second column, 
page 200 and the top of the first column page 201 says: 
" I t is the opinion of this Court that the District 
Court, being a court of original jurisdiction, pur-
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suant to the Constitution of the State of Utah, 
cannot delegate and cannot divest its jurisdiction 
to the Juvenile Court in a case such as th is . " 
And we quote from page 201, first column, para-
graph [2, 3] as follows: 
We feel that the proper interpretation that should 
be placed upon section 55-10-77, subsection (4), 
is this : 
That if and when the District Court avails itself 
of such a referral to the Juvenile Court, it is 
only for the purpose of having the agencies of 
the Juvenile Court with the assistance of the 
Judge, to make an evaluation, determination or 
recommendation. That this having been done by 
the Juvenile Court, the Juvenile Court in turn 
should make such findings and recommendations 
pursuant to the information which it has received 
for evaluation and consideration affecting the 
custody of the minor children, and refer the mat-
ter again to the District Court for its final deter-
mination. We think to do otherwise would in 
reality distort and make unrealistic the duties 
and obligations vested in the District Courts of 
the S ta te . " 
In the case of Eugene A. Anderson vs. Kathleen 
B. Anderson, 416 P.2d 308, 18 U.2d 89 it involves the 
question of when the District Court has granted a di-
vorce and awarded custody of children and support 
money, and the Juvenile Court in a proceeding in the 
interest of the children, makes a different Order, does 
its order supersede the judgment of the District Court, 
The Court in answer to this question on Page 310 states: 
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"To accept plaintiff's contention that the Juve-
nile Court has exclusive juridiction precluding 
any further action by the District Court would 
have the effect of permitting the Juvenile Court 
to become a court of review which could modify 
or nullify the judgments and orders of the Dis-
trict Court. This would be neither essential to 
nor consistent with the purpose of the new stat-
ute, Sees. 15 and 16, Chapter 165 S.L.U. 1965 
(Code identification, Sees. 55-10-77, 78 IT.C.A. 
1953). It is apparent that that purpose was to 
confer concurrent jurisdiction on the Juvenile 
Court to act in the interest of Children in various 
kinds of troubled circumstances set forth in Sec. 
77." 
In the case of In Re State in the interest of Valdez, 
504 P.2d 1372, the Supreme Court held on Page 1374 par-
agraph No. 3 as follows: 
"Since a proceeding is commenced in the Juve-
nile Court by filing a petition, Section 55-10-83(1) 
in the instant action, the case was pending at the 
time the petition for a writ of habeas corpus was 
filed. Under such circumstances, under the pro-
visions of Section 55-10-78, the district court may 
certify the question of custody to the Juvenile 
Court for the purpose of evaluation. When this 
process is completed and the Juvenile Court has 
made findings and a recommendation, the matter 
should again be referred to the district for final 
determination." 
And on Page 1376, the end of the opinion states: 
"The instant case is, in fact, a conventional cus-
tody dispute between the maternal and paternal 
relatives and is within the jurisdiction of the dis-
trict court. The juvenile court erred in its deter-
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mination that it had exclusive jurisdiction, and 
its order granting temporary custody to the Divi-
sion of Family Services is null and void. This 
case is remanded to the Juvenile Court for its 
determination concerning the custody of the chil-
dren, before reference back to the district court 
for final determination in the habeas corpus pro-
ceedings." 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that Roger had been with the Lujans for 
almost ten years and a close bond of love and affection 
has developed, and we submit that he should not have 
been taken away from the Lujans without a full and 
proper hearing. 
The Juvenile Court should never have changed the 
heading of the case, and all of the proceedings in the 
matter should have been in the case pertaining to the 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The Court should 
have allowed evidence to be introduced as to the allega-
tions contained in the Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus. 
It is appellants' contention that if appellants would 
have been able to proceed in the matter, they could have 
introduced evidence and facts which would have shown 
that the Juvenile Court did not have jurisdiction over 
the Lujans nor over Roger. In any event, the Juvenile 
Court should have heard the matter, made its recom-
mendations and the matter should have been referred 
back to Judge Banks of the District Court. 
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We submit that the Order should be reversed or 
stricken, that a proper hearing be ordered and that the 
matter be referred back to the District Court for its final 
determination. 
Eespectfully submitted: 
GOLDEN W. BOBBINS 
Attorney for Floyd Roger Hales 
by his next of kin and friends 
and custodians Jose Lujan 
and Maggie Lujan 
705 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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